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Algorithmic decision-making is rapidly evolving as 
a source of data-driven competitive advantage with 
important implications for analytical practices in 
multiple settings. Despite the ambitions for 
algorithmic and intelligent technologies, however, the 
requirement for quality data input to the algorithm 
poses a significant challenge for its actual adoption. 
The trend towards open data might bring additional 
challenges such as strategic gaming and distortion of 
meaning. To address this problem, we draw on a two-
year long qualitative case study of a firm in 
international maritime trade to understand the role of 
uncertainty associated with open data upon the uptake 
of a novel algorithm. We combine an uncertainty and 
assemblage perspective to unpack the arrangements 
by which the organization configures relations of 
humans and machine to mitigate this problem. We 
highlight the phenomenon of edge cases as a key 
challenge for automation and propose that an 
assemblage of augmentation and automation allows a 
dynamic arrangement that support the introduction 
and organization of algorithmic decision-making 
under uncertainty. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Artificial intelligence (AI) including data analytics 
and learning algorithms is evolving as a key priority 
for decision-making [1] and is already transforming 
predictive practices in domains such as medicine, law, 
finance, and transportation. Despite the growing 
interest in AI among IS (Information Systems) 
scholars and practitioners, however, there is a 
continuing gap between the ambitions for AI and its 
actual adoption [2]. A significant challenge and 
probable reason for this gap is that AI places great 
demands on the availability of quality data input [3, 4]. 
Data not only tend to be heterogeneous and 
unstructured [5], they tend to be controlled by certain 
organizations [6], be open in the public domain or 
becoming a commodity [7, 8, 9]. Whereas control over 
data may be a source of competitive advantage [10], 
mandated openness can undermine competitiveness to 
the extent that competitors or regulators get hold of 
strategically sensitive information [11, 12]. In such 
environments, increased openness and transparency 
can give rise to ‘gaming’ of the data [8, 13, 14] and 
‘distortion of meaning’, with performative 
consequences for analytics and decision-making [8]. 
Despite the recognition that the uncertainty associated 
with data represent a significant challenge to the 
adoption of AI [3, 15, 16, 17], knowledge of what 
constitutes a problematic situation and how its 
resolution involve arrangement of humans and 
algorithms [4], is still limited. Therefore, 
understanding the uncertainty associated with open 
data might have important implications for how 
organizations can “efficiently identify and handle 
many types of noisy data” [4] and thus organize upon 
the introduction of algorithmic decision-making.  
In this paper, we examine these questions in the 
context of mandated data openness and explore 
organizational arrangements for mitigating the 
uncertainty that follows the strategic interests over 
externally sourced data. Our research question thus is: 
What problematic situations in open data 
environments and types of algorithmic decision-
making involve division of labor between humans and 
algorithms? 
To answer our research question, we draw on a 
two-year long qualitative case study of a brokering 
firm in international maritime trade. The firm’s 
analytics division acquired near real-time data from 
the Automatic Identification System (an open, global 
information infrastructure retrieving and transmitting 
detailed data on vessel movement) via satellites and 
adopted a classification algorithm to support the 
prediction of ship behavior and, in turn, global trade 
on oil. In this case, classifications of data input were 
uncertain due to ‘edge cases’ exemplified by ships (i.e. 





the observed) gaming or distorting data about their 
actual activity at sea. Through drawing on the 
phenomenon of edge cases in this context, we are 
interested to contribute an understanding of what 
constitute a problematic situation and the division of 
labor between humans and machines that emerges as a 
response to this [4]. 
The concept of edge cases comes with different 
meanings, but can generally be understood as cases 
that involve input values that require special handling 
by the system. We further understand uncertainty 
associated with open data edge cases as problematic 
“situations which involves unknown or imperfect 
information” [16, 21] that constrain the adoption of 
algorithmic decision-making, because “uncertainty 
refers to the degree to which the future states of the 
environment cannot be accurately anticipated or 
predicted due to imperfect information” [22]. 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we review 
recent literature on data-driven and algorithmic 
decision-making with an emphasis on task automation, 
augmentation, and assemblage approaches. Building 
on this background, we highlight the phenomenon of 
edge cases and combine uncertainty and assemblage 
perspectives to develop our analytical frame. Next, we 
outline our case study research approach followed by 
a brief background description of our case from the 
international maritime trade. In the case findings 
section, we illustrate four ‘edge cases’ and the case 
organization’s responses to these as it sought to 
introduce algorithmic decision-making into the fabric 
of the organization. In the analysis and discussion, we 
elaborate on the relevance of assemblages for evolving 
algorithmic decision-making in the context of open 
data and uncertainty. 
 
2. Related research and framework  
 
2.1. Automating, augmenting, and assembling 
algorithmic decision-making 
 
Newell and Marabelli [1] take data-driven and 
algorithmic decision-making to comprise vast data 
that are processed by algorithms with the aim of 
predicting objects’ behavior based on their current or 
past behavior. Similarly, Faraj et al. [23] refer to 
learning algorithms as “machine learning, 
computation, and statistical techniques .. [that] rely on 
large data sets to generate responses, classifications, or 
dynamic predictions that resemble those of a 
knowledge worker”. Prediction, here understood as 
using information you do have to produce information 
you do not have [15], then, constitutes a fundamental 
task of algorithmic decision-making systems and the 
learning algorithms on which these are based [24]. 
Following an information processing and task 
perspective, von Krogh [4] suggests that while such AI 
systems entail task input in the form of data and task 
processing by algorithms, task outcomes involve 
either conclusions based on available data (i.e. 
decision-making) or alternative courses of action to 
resolve a problem (i.e. problem-solving). Drawing on 
this task approach, Rai et al. [25] propose that AI 
systems do not only comprise task substitution by 
which AI automates or replaces tasks that human used 
to perform. They also comprise task augmentation 
where humans and AI complement one another to 
perform a task; and task assemblages in which humans 
and AI are dynamically brought together as an 
integrated unit to perform an emergent task [25].  
The Information Systems (IS) and organization 
literature has already recognized an augmentation 
approach [19, 23, 25, 26]. For example, recent 
empirical research has showed that organizations 
bring humans in the loop of the algorithm to evaluate 
cases that are unknown to the algorithm and to 
improve the accuracy of the algorithm [27]. Similarly, 
in interactive machine learning and active learning 
systems [28], an unknown or unconfident task can be 
delegated to a human(s) who manually labels (or 
annotates or classifies) it, and then feed it back to the 
algorithm for learning experience.  
While there is a growing interest in algorithmic 
decision-making, however, organizational research on 
the dynamic configuration of humans and algorithms 
upon emergent, problematic tasks, is still limited. Such 
inquiry might benefit from the collection and analysis 
of rich material on problematic situations [4]. In the 
following we therefore adopt edge cases as a 
sensitizing concept and take human-algorithm 
collaboration as the central analytical component. 
 
2.2. Edge cases, uncertainty, and assemblages 
 
Edge cases, when framed as “situations where little 
data exists” [33], relate to uncertainty which refers to 
not having enough information [29]. When taken as 
“data that are encountered for the first time” [3], edge 
cases pertain to ambiguity which denotes “not having 
a conceptual framework for interpreting information” 
[29]. Furthermore, in big data setting we assume that 
edge cases also concern complexity - having to process 
more information than you can manage or understand; 
and equivocality - having several competing or 
contradictory conceptual frameworks [29]. A 
framework in this sense can include both machine 
learning models and human cognitive frames that rely 
on some system of classification. In the case of 
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equivocality, then, algorithms and humans can have 
contradictory frameworks that may or may not 
complement one another. 
Zack [29] further argued that machines are more 
appropriate for handling decision problems 
characterized by complexity and uncertainty, whereas 
humans are better suited for handling ambiguity and 
equivocality. In this view, problems of uncertainty and 
ambiguity can be resolved by acquiring more 
information and interpretative frames. However, such 
acquisitive processing strategies in turn give rise to 
problems of complexity and equivocality. Problems of 
complexity and equivocality, on the other hand, might 
be resolved by restricting existing information and 
diverse interpretations. However, such restrictive 
processing strategies appear to come at the expense of 
the data scale effects underpinning the promises of 
automation underpinning ‘big data’ and AI systems. 
Thus, edge cases associated with uncertainty and 
complexity emerge as subject to analysis and 
automation; while ambiguity and equivocality be 
subject to interpretation and augmentation. However, 
because the resolution of one decision problem, e.g., 
equivocality, can trigger another problem, e.g., 
uncertainty [29], there is need to understand the 
dynamic reconfiguration of the problem-solving 
structure. 
Rather than taking algorithmic decision-making as 
a predefined and stable phenomenon [cf. 18], we are 
interested to examine the situations which 
configurations of algorithmic decision-making spring 
from [19]. We draw on a notion of assemblage that 
views humans, algorithms, data and practices as 
“heterogeneous components interrelated to one 
another in such a way that brings about evolving 
patterns of actions” [20]. “Offered in part as 
replacements” [18] for the input-processing-output 
view and the separation of human and machine, then, 
Suchman’s conception of (re)configuration suggests 
that an assemblage lens is useful to "expand the space 
of interaction from the interface narrowly defined to 
the ambient environments and transformed and 
transformative subject-object relations that comprise 
lived experience of technological practice” [18]. Here, 
avocation denotes arrangements and affordances of 
through which humans are hailed to enter a 
technological assemblage; invocation denotes actions 
that define the events that effect changes to the 
assemblage; and evocation denotes the material 
changes that result and in turn comprise the possibility 





3. Case selection and research methods 
 
We conducted an interpretive qualitative case 
study [30] of ShipBroker over two years, beginning in 
September 2017 and ending in October 2019. 
ShipBroker (dubbed for anonymization), a global 
shipbrokering firm since the mid-1800, operates a 
network of >10 offices worldwide and employs 
several hundred employees. The firm intermediates 
logistics and commodity freight such as oil and gas on 
behalf of cargo owners, ship owners and charterers. 
ShipBroker’s services rely upon detailed research and 
analysis on current market developments and seaborne 
trade. Here, a mission-critical data source is the 
Automatic Identification System (AIS), a global 
communication and tracking system which is used for 
exchange of maritime navigational information 
between AIS-equipped terminals. Since 2002, the AIS 
is mandatory installation for international ships (or 
vessels) with 300 or more gross tonnages. The AIS 
works by retrieving GPS coordinates from satellites 
and transmitting data on ship behavior and qualities to 
nearby stations (including ships, vessel traffic 
services, buoys) via VHF radio signals. ShipBroker 
relies on AIS data to track ships and ports and in turn 
construct aggregates on global trade. 
Initial access sprung from an existing development 
project between ShipBroker and an enterprise 
software company where the first author was 
employed during his PhD. Further access was 
negotiated between the author and the firms’ top 
management in spring 2017 and allowed us to take part 
in both strategic and operational activities with 
ShipBroker’s research department which specializes 
in ‘shipping intelligence’, trade and freight analyses. 
Our role and intent as researchers in the field were 
clearly communicated to the informants, and 
observations and interviews were based on informed 
consent and confidentiality about business-critical 
information. We have by purpose anonymized the 
names and gender of the subjects involved in our 
research.  
Our main method was participant observation, 
complemented by informal interviews, conversation, 
and reviews of documentation. Participant observation 
were undertaken in a total of 39 meetings and during a 
two-week-long design workshop in early 2018. The 
meetings were mainly on-site and lasted between 
thirty minutes and five hours, with an average duration 
of 104 minutes. During our fieldwork, we regularly 
conducted informal interviews and conversation, 
including in-person meetings, lunch meetings, face-to-
face conversations in the field as well as over 
telephone, to follow up and verify our observations. 
We avoided recording our observations and 
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conversations so as to ensure openness and trust, and  
instead focused our attention on taking notes during 
the field work and wrote these out into memos and 
narratives shortly after the meetings. We examined 
documentary sources including company PowerPoint-
based market analyses, Excel spreadsheets of ship 
voyages, customer contract excerpts, trade journal 
articles, newspaper articles, web sites, ship tracking 
software, and code such as MySQL queries. We were 
also given a company chat and email account on which 
we regularly conversed with our key informants. 
Conducting the data collection in tandem with data 
analysis allowed us to recursively iterate between 
emerging empirical material and theoretical concepts 
in the datafication, big data analytics, business 
intelligence, and AI streams within the IS and 
organizational research literature. To guide our 
analysis, we adopted a narrative and visual mapping 
approach [34]. The narrative approach consisted of 
writing theoretical memos to gradually develop more 
detailed narratives and vignettes from the data. We 
further mapped and organized our material into a 
broader set of themes [35] such as “obscuring”, 
“secreting”, and “going dark”. Drawing on the 
narratives and themes together with our informants, 
we set boundaries for our analysis and focused 
attention on material revolving around ‘edge cases’. 
We complemented this with the visual mapping 
approach to generate temporal data bases, which 
allowed identification of relevant, more abstract 
themes and relationships as we explored data-theory 
links in light of new empirical material.  
 
4. Case findings 
 
4.1. Encountering edge cases 
 
In fall 2017, a group of executives—the CEO and 
CDO (Chief Digital Officer) at ShipBroker and the 
CEO at the enterprise software provider—gathered to 
discuss potential solutions to strategic challenges and 
changes in the competitive market. Due to rapid 
digitalization and adaptation of AIS data, the global 
maritime trade industry had been subject to 
commoditization and symmetrization of mission-
critical information. Data on the activities of the global 
trade fleet, which traditionally had been advantageous 
to the brokers (according to one senior analyst), was 
now becoming available and accessible across the 
value chain. However, ShipBroker was not only facing 
long-term risks of disintermediation, it was also 
exposed to secreting and obscuring of ships’ digital 
traces, such as tampering with data on the movement, 
destination, and draught level of ships’ hull. 
Recurrently referred to as “going dark”, “fake news”, 
and "teleporting” among our informants, these data 
quality issues (called edge cases) constituted a 
significant challenge to the analysts who relied on 
accurate and timely data to intermediate exchange of 
logistics between ship and cargo owners. 
Towards the end of the executive meeting, a new 
strategic direction had emerged. First and foremost, 
ShipBroker sought to use smart algorithms to turn 
external and internal trade data into a strategic asset, 
to support human decision-making, and, eventually, 
drive competitive advantage. The question of how to 
integrate extant digital work with the development of 
algorithmic decision-making in face of problematic 
data input, however, remained an open question. On 
the backdrop of these conditions, we next illustrate 
four ‘edge cases’, and the resolutions to these, that 
were involved in the work of introducing algorithmic 
decision-making into the social fabric of the 
organization. Table 1 summarizes the edge cases, their 
nature of uncertainty, and the responses to these. 
 
Table 1 Summary of edge cases, uncertainty 
characteristics and responses 
Edge cases Nature of uncertainty and responses 
The ‘fake 
news’ cases 
The decision problem was characterized by 
complexity where there was a diversity of 
spellings/meanings in the destination fields, 
and equivocality where the data and its 
meaning could be interpreted in multiple 
ways e.g., avoiding pirates or distorting for 
commercial gain. ShipBroker’s resolution 
entailed collective human auditing of the 
algorithmic outcome to update the 
framework and altering of the algorithm’s 




The decision problem mainly was 
characterized by uncertainty because there 
was not enough information to describe a 
current state or to predict future states.  
The going-
dark cases 
The decision problem was characterized by 
uncertainty where there was not enough data 
to describe a current state, and ambiguity 
since there was no sufficient explanation for 
the event. ShipBroker’s response involved 
acquiring contextual data and interpretation 
from domain experts, and then altering the 




The decision problem was characterized by 
ambiguity and equivocality because there was 
either no framework to explain the event or 
multiple explanations. ShipBroker’s response 
entailed deep human-to-human discussions, 
however, with no confident explanation.  
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4.2. The ‘fake news’ cases 
 
In one of the many meetings that were focused on 
evaluating the algorithm, a team of participants 
collectively and carefully examined algorithmic 
output: ship movements, their voyage patterns, and 
drought change at certain ports. The problem case was 
malicious or erroneous data records on the activity of 
a certain ship. One possible explanation to the 
inconsistencies was technical: that another ship had 
interfered with its AIS signals. But the more likely 
explanation was human: that the ship operator had 
tampered with the data transmission. Typically, for 
any voyage ship operators must manually type into 
their AIS transponder information about its 
destination, among other fields. For example, on 
several occasions various members of the team 
referred to a ‘thousand variations of the port of 
Singapore’ which the algorithm had picked up. To 
counter this problem, the data scientist on the team set 
out to encode all kind of various portmanteaus, 
abbreviations, acronyms, etc. related the port of 
Singapore and subsequently collected any new 
variation that the team encountered throughout the 
process of evaluating the algorithmic outcome. Arrays 
of port spellings were then integrated into the 
algorithm’s ‘mapping function’ so that it could 
normalize such instances going forward. While this 
specific case made a reference point in subsequent 
meetings, consensus was that there generally are 
incentives for ship operators to obscure mission-
critical data. This type of problem, often referred to as 
“fake news” or faking destinations, was frequent. 
Accordingly, the process of revising data and updating 
the algorithm had to be repeated for the reminding 
ports that accepted ships in this segment. 
 
4.3. The withholding case 
 
 “This just arrived on the desk of one of the senior 
brokers”, the CDO uttered while putting a print-out 
onto the office desk. He was referring to a client 
contract that specifically described conditions on the 
timing for dissemination of voyage data. One client 
had intentionally requested that information on its 
ship’s whereabouts was to be withheld. More 
specifically, by caps lock wording in the contract the 
client had requested that by the time the vessel was 
going to pass Skew (on the Northern coast of 
Denmark) all involved parties should wait as long as 
possible until transmitting the true destination of the 
ship. The ship was departing from Russia with 
hundreds of thousands of tons of crude oil and heading 
for the southern US coast, but, apparently, the 
‘observers’ did not need to know about this until there 
was no doubt about its actual destination.  
This situation somewhat confirmed extant 
presumptions that strategic withholding of voyage 
data is not an abnormal practice among competitors 
and the fleet in general. Thus, the situation added to 
the development agenda that also contract data should 
be systemically collected and consolidated with AIS 
data to augment timely decision-making. 
Nevertheless, the speed at which AIS data was 
collected and trade files were produced was deemed 
important.  
 
4.4. The going-dark cases 
 
Ships “going dark” was another imminent issue in 
the intelligence augmentation process. This problem 
of incomplete or missing data on ship activity became 
apparent in multiple meetings which dealt with a 
reoccurring case—dubbed the ‘South Korean issue’ or 
the ‘Korean case’ by the team members—in which a 
substantial number of ships voyaging by the Korean 
Peninsula suddenly yet continuously went missing 
from the interactive monitoring tools. Unfortunately, 
this resulted in distorted data sets. As the digital 
executive explained to an external consultant: “When 
a ship is approaching Korea, it always goes black, so 
we need to use algorithms to determine which port the 
ship actually goes to.” In addition, the project 
management team approached the satellite operator 
from which ShipBroker pulled AIS data to ask for 
potential explanations. However, the satellite operator 
answered that this was a general issue that was out of 
their control and that there was no immediate solution 
to it. Instead, the development team assumed that this 
problem could be resolved by instructing the algorithm 
to do ‘guesswork’ about the vessel movement based 
on historical data on voyages. 
 
4.5. The teleporting cases 
 
“How can it possibly be that a vessel that was 
located by the coast of Texas yesterday is observed in 
Middle East Gulf at the present”, the CDO confronted 
the development team. This is physically impossible, 
so why is it the case, the team wondered. Issues like 
this, referred to as ‘teleporting’ among our informants, 
were rather frequently observed during the many 
evaluation meetings focused on scrutinizing 
algorithmic outcome. The data scientist and the rest of 
the team were scratching their head on how to solve 
these abnormalities because it debased the trade files. 
With no ready solution at hand, investigations into 
how the algorithm could be designed to handle such 
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teleporting issues were started. A couple of diagnosis 
were suggested. The prevailing explanation was that 
some ships might be equipped with duplicate 
identification numbers. It was speculated that this has 
historically been done for cost saving reasons. These 
cases of abnormal output represented edge cases that 
required cycles of human evaluation leading to 
multiple yet uncertain explanations for the event. 
 
5. Analysis and discussion 
 
5.1. Assembling human and algorithmic 
decision-making under uncertainty 
 
Recent research has described how organizations 
bring humans into the loop of the algorithm to 
augment and improve the accuracy of analysis [27]. 
However, it remains uncertain how such augmentative 
efforts can be efficiently integrated with the 
opportunities for speed and scaling provided by 
automation, under conditions of uncertainty. We build 
on this to explore how organizations can achieve a 
balance between the two in face of ‘edge cases’ as a 
significant challenge for achieving accurate 
algorithmic decision-making based on open data. 
 
 
Figure 1 Human-in-the-loop pattern for 
augmenting analytics (adapted from [27]) 
 
Most notably, we observed that preexisting 
assemblages come to serve as backdrops to new 
assemblages and comprise both the notions of 
automation and augmentation. A key reason for the 
emergence of this composite assemblage was the need 
to overcome the challenges of uncertainty that come 
with the input of open data (i.e. edge cases).  
Towards their vision of achieving automated 
analysis and algorithmic decision-making (the inner 
loops in Figure 1), ShipBroker commenced from a 
manual practice of computer-supported data analytics 
(the outer loop) in which the mundane handling of 
edge cases was considered to cause a bottleneck for 
achieving timely analyses. As a response to this 
bottleneck, ShipBroker’s development team 
introduced a classification algorithm to automate and 
speed up the classification work.  
Following the introduction of the algorithm, we 
observed that the new practices of human auditing – 
evaluating the algorithmic output against a ground 
truth; and altering - changing the parameters and rules 
of the algorithm were necessary to improve the 
accuracy of the algorithm. However, this new work 
also limited the performance of the system compared 
to what a more automated approach would have 
offered. 
Yeow and Faraj [20] note that preexisting 
assemblages serve as a backdrop to new or changed 
assemblages, and that the performance of the focal 
assemblage depends on its surrounding assemblages to 
co-perform. In this case, we see that the outer 'human 
assemblage' (i.e. data acquisition-human 
classification-analysis in Figure 1) is linked to and 
serves a backdrop to the mid 'automation assemblage' 
(data acquisition-algorithmic classification-analysis), 
which in turn serves as a backdrop to the inner 
‘augmentation assemblage’ (algorithmic 
classification-auditing-altering). Here, the main 
purpose of the latter assemblage was to augment the 
algorithm so as to make it perform upon encounters 
with edge cases. In line with Yeow and Faraj’s 
performative assemblage, our observations suggest 
that parts of the assemblage (human classification) 
could be extracted from a preexisting assemblage (the 
human assemblage) to another (the augmentation 
assemblage) creating different relationships, here 
seeing that the work of human classification was 
repurposed to provide a ground truth measure to the 
auditing of edge cases. Similarly, the work of human 
auditing could be extracted from the augmentation 
assemblage to the center-most ‘training assemblage’ 
(algorithmic classification-human auditing). 
While these arrangements correspond with the 
input-processing-output task flow [4] (from left to 
right in Figure 1), the assemblage approach of 
Suchman [18] allowed us to also capture where 
humans are included (avocation) in the assemblages to 
deal with problematic situations (invocation) and 
provide auditing and altering of the algorithm 
(evocation). Here, altering was mainly concerned with 
ambiguity and equivocality problems as new 
frameworks were developed and introduced to the 
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algorithm. Auditing entailed dealing with uncertainty 
and complexity problems, which could be resolved by 
providing the algorithm with (training) examples, as 
congruent with the idea of interactive machine 
learning algorithms [28]. 
The reconfiguration of this nested assemblage of 
humans and the algorithm, augmentation and 
automation processes, is dynamic in the sense that the 
organization can have one or more of the assemblages 
to co-perform more or less concurrently [20]. For 
example, the (outer) manual/human assemblage can 
run in parallel to the augmentation and automation 
assemblages to allow continuation of 'business as 
usual’ while also enabling design and use of the 
algorithm. The assembling of algorithmic decision-
making thus appears to be temporally emergent and 
dependent on the former assemblages.  This example 
of a trajectory of algorithmic decision-making can 
give researchers and practitioners a clue about the 
evolving and relational problem-solving arrangements 
which machine learning and AI spring from [19]. 
 
5.2. Implications for algorithmic decision-
making in open data environments 
 
Much of the literature on algorithmic decision-
making address cases where the underlying data is 
under organizational control. The issues with data 
quality can then (in principle) be improved given 
enough efforts. The situation is different with 
externally sourced data. Discussing the strategic 
implications of using available social media data, 
Constantiou and Kallinikos [5] emphasizes that these 
data are unstructured, heterogeneous, agnostic, and 
trans-semiotic. They argue that this makes the 
application of this data for strategic purposes more 
challenging.  
Our case relates to such external and highly 
variegated data, however not from social media, but 
from geospatial data shared via satellites and a global 
information infrastructure. Here, the issues of data 
quality and veracity are not “fixable”; this is a problem 
for which the organization must put remedies in place 
so that it can deal with the problem on a continuous 
basis. This resembles the challenges encountered in 
data-intensive, but physically inaccessible contexts 
such as sensor-rich offshore installations that are 
remotely monitored via data streams and algorithmic 
processing [31]. The employees do not know whether 
the data are or are not trustworthy, and they need to 
deal with this, e.g. through visualizing data in order to 
detect anomalous patterns in confounded data, sorting 
out whether the signal is impacted by interferences, 
and collectively sharing narratives that serve as 
relevant background information, e.g., on previous 




The use of open and externally sourced data as 
input to algorithmic decision-making comes with 
uncertainty issues. Introducing an algorithm and 
automatic processing may add new challenges. The 
initial expectation is often that the algorithm should 
help resolve these data issues, however, the algorithm 
itself is often perceived to be opaque and ‘black-
boxed’. The concerns about data quality and 
algorithmic opacity have generated recommendation 
for algorithmic audits and other human control 
mechanisms with the purpose to oversee and mitigate 
undesired outcomes. As these mechanisms depend on 
humans to both control and augment the algorithm, 
they are often denoted “human-in-the-loop” setups 
and defined by augmentation work. We believe that 
the notion of performative assemblage provides a 
useful perspective for further examining what the 
interplay of automation and augmentation entail for 
new ways of organizing algorithmic decision-making 




The research reported herein was supported in part 
by The Research Council of Norway (grant no. 
ES605954) and Iserv Computing AS. This paper 
presents independent research and the views expressed 





[1] S. Newell, and M. Marabelli, "Strategic opportunities 
(and challenges) of algorithmic decision-making: A call for 
action on the long-term societal effects of ‘datification’", 
The Journal of Strategic Information Systems, 24(1), 2015, 
pp. 3-14. 
 
[2] S. Ransbotham, D. Kiron, P. Gerbert, and M. Reeves, 
“Reshaping business with artificial intelligence: Closing the 
gap between ambition and action", MIT Sloan Management 
Review, 59(1), 2017. 
 
[3] V. Dhar, "When to trust robots with decisions, and when 
not to", Harvard Business Review, 17, 2016. 
 
[4] G. von Krogh, “Artificial intelligence in organizations: 
New opportunities for phenomenon-based theorizing”, 
Academy of Management Discoveries, 4 (4) (2018), pp. 
404-409 
Page 5663
[5] I.D. Constantiou and J. Kallinikos, “New games, new 
rules: big data and the changing context of strategy", Journal 
of Information Technology, 30(1), 2015, pp. 44-57. 
 
[6] S. Zuboff, “Big other: surveillance capitalism and the 
prospects of an information civilization", Journal of 
Information Technology, 30(1), 2015, pp. 75-89. 
 
[7] P. Vassilakopoulou, E. Skorve, and M. Aanestad, 
"Enabling openness of valuable information resources: 
Curbing data subtractability and exclusion", Information 
Systems Journal, 29(4), 2019, pp. 768-786. 
 
[8] O. Marjanovic and D. Cecez-Kecmanovic, "Exploring 
the tension between transparency and datification effects of 
open government IS through the lens of Complex Adaptive 
Systems", The Journal of Strategic Information Systems, 
26(3), 2017, pp. 210-232. 
 
[9] C. Loebbecke and A. Picot, “Reflections on societal and 
business model transformation arising from digitization and 
big data analytics: A research agenda", The Journal of 
Strategic Information Systems, 24(3), 2015, pp. 149-157. 
 
[10] A. Hagiu and J. Wright, "When data creates competitive 
advantage", Harvard Business Review, 98(1), 2020, pp. 94-
101. 
 
[11] M. M. Appleyard and H. W. Chesbrough, "The 
dynamics of open strategy: from adoption to reversion", 
Long Range Planning, 50(3), 2017, pp. 310-321. 
 
[12] J. Hautz, D. Seidl, and R. Whittington, "Open strategy: 
Dimensions, dilemmas, dynamics", Long Range Planning, 
50(3), 2017, pp. 298-309. 
 
[13] W. N. Espeland and M. Sauder, "Rankings and 
reactivity: How public measures recreate social worlds", 
American journal of sociology, 113(1), 2007, pp. 1-40. 
 
[14] S. V. Scott and W. J. Orlikowski, "Reconfiguring 
relations of accountability: Materialization of social media 
in the travel sector", Accounting, organizations and society, 
37(1), 2012, pp. 26-40. 
 
[15] A. Agrawal, J. S. Gans, and A. Goldfarb, "Exploring the 
impact of artificial intelligence  : Prediction versus 
judgment", Information Economics and Policy, 47(1), 2019, 
pp. 1-6. 
 
[16] R. H. Hariri, E. M. Fredericks, and K. M. Bowers, 
"Uncertainty in big data analytics: survey, opportunities, and 
challenges", Journal of Big Data, 6(1), 44, 2019. 
 
[17] C. W. Tsai, C. F. Lai, H. C. Chao, and A. V. Vasilakos, 
“Big data analytics: a survey”, Journal of Big data, 2(1), 21, 
2015. 
 
[18] Suchman, L., Human-Machine Reconfigurations: Plans 
and Situated Actions. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2006. 
[19] D. E. Bailey and S. R. Barley, “Beyond design and use: 
How scholars should study intelligent technologies", 
Information and Organization, 100286, 2019. 
 
[20] A. Yeow and S. Faraj, “Technology and sociomaterial 
performation", in vol. 446 of IFIP Advances in Information 
and Communication Technology (B. Doolin, E. Lamprou, 
and N. Mitev, eds.), pp. 48-65, Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 
2014. 
 
[21] Knight, F. H., Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit. Hart, 
Schaffner & Marx, New York, 1921. 
 
[22] P. A. Pavlou, H. Liang, and Y. Xue, “Understanding 
and mitigating uncertainty in online exchange relationships: 
A principal-agent perspective", MIS quarterly, 2007, pp. 
105-136. 
 
[23] S. Faraj, S. Pachidi, and K. Sayegh, "Working and 
organizing in the age of the learning algorithm”, Information 
and Organization, 28(1), 2018, pp. 62-70. 
 
[24] P. J. Ågerfalk, “Artificial intelligence as digital 
agency", European Journal of Information Systems, 29(1), 
2020, pp. 1-8. 
 
[25] A. Rai, P. Constantinides, and S. Sarker, "Editor's 
comments: next-generation digital platforms: toward 
human–AI hybrids", Mis Quarterly, 43(1), 2019, pp. iii-x. 
 
[26] Markus, M. L., “Datification, organizational strategy, 
and IS research: What’s the score?", The Journal of Strategic 
Information Systems, 26(3), 2017, pp. 233-241. 
 
[27] T. Grønsund and M. Aanestad, "Augmenting the 
algorithm: Emerging human-in-the-loop work 
configurations", The Journal of Strategic Information 
Systems, 101614, 2020. 
 
[28] I. Rahwan, “Society-in-the-loop: programming the 
algorithmic social contract", Ethics and Information 
Technology, 20(1), 2018, pp. 5-14. 
 
[29] M. H. Zack, “The role of decision support systems in an 
indeterminate world", Decision Support Systems, 43(4), 
2007, pp. 1664-1674. 
 
[30] G. Walsham, “Interpretive case studies in IS research: 
nature and method", European Journal of information 
systems, 4(2), 1995, pp. 74-81. 
 
[31] E. Monteiro and E. Parmiggiani, "Synthetic knowing: 
the politics of the internet of things", MIS Quarterly, 43(1), 
2019, pp. 167-184. 
 
[32] T. Østerlie, P. G. Almklov, and V. Hepsø, "Dual 
materiality and knowing in petroleum production", 
Information and organization, 22(2), 2012, pp. 85-105. 
 
Page 5664
[33] H. J. Wilson, P. R. Daugherty, and C. Davenport, "The 
Future of AI Will Be About Less Data, Not More", Harvard 
Business Review, 2019. 
 
[34] A. Langley, “Strategies for theorizing from process 
data", Academy of Management review, 24(4), 1999, pp. 
691-710. 
 
[35] G. Walsham, "Doing interpretive research", European 
journal of information systems, 15(3), 2006, pp. 320-330. 
Page 5665
